05-017 · EVIDENCE B · SOURCE-SENSITIVE

Using broad-market index funds instead of actively managed funds as a long-term core holding (the portion of money you keep invested for years)

用宽基指数基金替代主动管理基金作为长期底仓(长期拿着不动的那部分钱)

Source cost

There is no direct monetary cost. The trade-off is that you give up the chance of picking a “star fund manager.” The harder part is that when the index drops, you must endure those losses too — you can’t simply sell out midway.

Source return

The collection of stocks held by actively managed funds already closely mirrors the overall market. Yet the extra management fees they charge are deducted straight from your actual returns. When we repeatedly re-randomize fund performance data to test how much luck plays a role, very few funds manage to generate enough outperformance to offset those fees.

Evidence grade

B

THE LOW-ROI DETOURSatire, not advice

Move “Using broad-market index funds instead of actively managed funds as a long-term core holding (the portion of money you keep invested for years)” to Future Me's calendar

The excuse

Future Me has a clearer calendar, more patience, and apparently the same responsibilities.

What feels good now

Today I keep a few minutes, a bit of persistence and avoid interrupting my default routine.

What the source says

The source summarizes the return this way: “The collection of stocks held by actively managed funds already closely mirrors the overall market. Yet the extra management fees they charge are deducted straight from your actual returns. When we repeatedly re-randomize fund performance data to test how much luck plays a role, very few funds manage to generate enough outperformance to offset those fees.” Evidence grade B. The original states the population, caveats, and sources; this is not a personal forecast.

THE ENGLISH EDITION

Original recommendation and evidence

Source commit a994b6a0c905

17. Using broad-market index funds instead of actively managed funds as a long-term core holding (the portion of money you keep invested for years)

Cost: There is no direct monetary cost. The trade-off is that you give up the chance of picking a “star fund manager.” The harder part is that when the index drops, you must endure those losses too — you can’t simply sell out midway.

In plain terms: The collection of stocks held by actively managed funds already closely mirrors the overall market. Yet the extra management fees they charge are deducted straight from your actual returns. When we repeatedly re-randomize fund performance data to test how much luck plays a role, very few funds manage to generate enough outperformance to offset those fees.

Benefit: Collectively, U.S. actively managed equity funds hold a portfolio very similar to the broader market. However, their high management costs directly translate into lower net returns for investors after fees are deducted. This research used a bootstrap simulation method to repeatedly shuffle fund performance data and gauge how much could be attributed to luck alone. The results show that only a tiny fraction of funds achieve excess returns large enough to cover their fees (U.S., published 2010). S&P Dow Jones Indices conducts an annual review: in 2024, 65% of U.S. actively managed large-cap equity funds underperformed the S&P 500. Over a 24-year span, an average of 64% underperformed each year. In the 15 years ending 2024, no single fund category saw a majority of active funds outperforming their respective benchmarks.

Evidence grade: B

Sources: Fama EF, French KR (2010). Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns. The Journal of Finance 65(5):1915-1947. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01598.x>; S&P Dow Jones Indices (2025). SPIVA U.S. Scorecard Year-End 2024. <https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/spiva/article/spiva-us/> (The official website refuses to be automatically captured, and the numbers are checked against the archive of 2025-05-12: <https://web.archive.org/web/20250512071051/https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/spiva/article/spiva-us/>); S&P Dow Jones Indices (2025). SPIVA Asia Ex-Japan Scorecard Mid-Year 2025 (Report 1a, China Large-Cap underperforms the S&P China A 300: 60.5% in 1 year, 69.6% in 3 years, 50.8% in 5 years). <https://web.archive.org/web/20251103165922/https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/spiva/spiva-asia-ex-japan-mid-year-2025.pdf> (Official website rejects automatic crawling, check according to archive); Harvey CR, Liu Y (2022). Luck versus Skill in the Cross Section of Mutual Fund Returns: Reexamining the Evidence. The Journal of Finance, 77(3). <https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13123> (Disputing Party)

Notes: Debate exists: one study re-examined this conclusion and argued that the original Fama-French methodology of repeatedly re-sampling data might be overly strict. Under that approach, even funds with genuinely strong outperformance could be classified as “no different from luck.” Thus, the claim that “almost no active funds possess skill” might be overstated. In China, the data is less one-sided than in the U.S. As of June 2025, S&P Dow Jones statistics show that for A-share large-cap active funds, 60.5% underperformed the S&P China A 300 Index over one year, 69.6% over three years, and 50.8% over five years. This dataset only covers up to five years, so longer-term figures remain unavailable. Consequently, while it is still uncertain whether active funds consistently underperform in China, the advantage of lower fees for index funds remains valid. This information does not constitute investment advice.

Read the complete Chinese source and notes

17. 用宽基指数基金替代主动管理基金作为长期底仓(长期拿着不动的那部分钱)

成本: 不花钱。代价是你放弃了「选中明星基金经理」的可能。难的是指数跌的时候,你也要跟着一起承受,不能中途跑掉。

说人话: 主动基金合起来买的那堆股票,已经很接近整个市场了。但它们多收的那笔管理费,是实打实从你到手的收益里扣掉的。把基金的业绩当成运气反复重算来比,能靠多赚的那部分把自己收的费挣回来的基金,很少。

收益: 美国主动股票型基金的整体组合接近市场组合:这些基金合起来持有的股票,和整个市场差不多。但主动管理的高成本原封不动地变成了投资者更低的净回报(扣完费用后到手的收益)。研究用了自助法模拟,把业绩反复随机重排,看单凭运气能做到什么程度。结果显示,很少有基金能产生足以覆盖成本的超额收益:基金比市场多赚的那部分,够不上它收的那笔费(美国,2010 年发表)。标普道琼斯指数公司每年统计一次:2024 年,美国主动管理的大盘股票基金有 65% 跑输标普 500。它统计了 24 年,平均每年有 64% 跑输。截至 2024 年底的 15 年里,所有类别中都没有哪一类是多数主动基金跑赢的

证据等级: B

来源: Fama EF, French KR (2010). Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns. The Journal of Finance 65(5):1915-1947. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01598.x>;S&P Dow Jones Indices (2025). SPIVA U.S. Scorecard Year-End 2024. <https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/spiva/article/spiva-us/>(官网拒绝自动抓取,数字按 2025-05-12 的存档核对:<https://web.archive.org/web/20250512071051/https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/spiva/article/spiva-us/>);S&P Dow Jones Indices (2025). SPIVA Asia Ex-Japan Scorecard Mid-Year 2025(Report 1a,China Large-Cap 对 S&P China A 300 的跑输比例:1 年 60.5%、3 年 69.6%、5 年 50.8%). <https://web.archive.org/web/20251103165922/https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/spiva/spiva-asia-ex-japan-mid-year-2025.pdf>(官网拒绝自动抓取,按存档核对);Harvey CR, Liu Y (2022). Luck versus Skill in the Cross Section of Mutual Fund Returns: Reexamining the Evidence. The Journal of Finance, 77(3). <https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13123>(争议方)

备注: 争议:有一篇文章重新检验过这个结论。它指出,Fama-French 那套反复重抽样本的检验方法抽得不够。照它的算法,就算一只基金多赚的那部分确实很明显,也可能被判成「和运气分不出区别」。所以「几乎没有基金有技能」这个结论可能下得过重了。中国的数字没有美国那么一边倒。标普道琼斯截至 2025 年 6 月的统计,A 股大盘主动基金跑输标普中国 A 股 300 指数的比例,1 年是 60.5%,3 年是 69.6%,5 年是 50.8%。这份统计只算到 5 年,拿不出更长的数。所以在中国,主动基金长期跑不赢指数还没有定论,但指数基金费率低这一点照样成立。不构成投资建议。

Author's scope notes: 争议:有一篇文章重新检验过这个结论。它指出,Fama-French 那套反复重抽样本的检验方法抽得不够。照它的算法,就算一只基金多赚的那部分确实很明显,也可能被判成「和运气分不出区别」。所以「几乎没有基金有技能」这个结论可能下得过重了。中国的数字没有美国那么一边倒。标普道琼斯截至 2025 年 6 月的统计,A 股大盘主动基金跑输标普中国 A 股 300 指数的比例,1 年是 60.5%,3 年是 69.6%,5 年是 50.8%。这份统计只算到 5 年,拿不出更长的数。所以在中国,主动基金长期跑不赢指数还没有定论,但指数基金费率低这一点照样成立。不构成投资建议。

YOUR PRIVATE LIST

Choose what to do with this idea

Original content by eternity4719 under CC BY 4.0. English translation is credited in the source notes. HowToLiveWorse adds a clearly labeled satirical response.

Full source and adaptation notes